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Abstract: The significant challenge faced by government in demonstrating value for money in the delivery of major infrastructure 
revolves around estimating costs and benefits of alternative modes of procurement. Faced with this challenge, one approach is to focus on a 
dominant performance outcome visible on the opening day of the asset, as the means to select the procurement approach. In this case, value 
for money becomes a largely nominal concept and determined by the procurement mode delivering, or not delivering,  the desired 
performance outcomeThis paper proposes a mind-set change in this particular practice, to an approach in which the analysis commences 
with the conditions pertaining to the project and proceeds to deploy transaction cost and production cost theory to indicate a procurement 
approach that can claim superior value for money relative to other competing procurement modes. This approach to delivering value for 
money in relative terms is developed in a first-order procurement decision making model outlined in this paper. The model developed could 
be complementary to the Public Sector Comparator (PSC) in terms of cross validation and the model more readily lends itself to public 
dissemination. As a possible alternative to the PSC, the model may save time and money in the preparation of project details to lesser 
extent than that required in the reference project associated with the PSC and may send a stronger signal to the market that might encourage 
more innovation and competition.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
  
The UK National Audit Office (2004) defines procurement as, “the 
whole-life process of the acquisition of goods, services and 
works..., beginning when a potential requirement is identified and 
ending with the conclusion of service contract or ultimate disposal 
of an asset”. The effective and efficient procurement of 
infrastructure is often translated as achieving value for money 
(VfM). HM Treasury (2008) defines VfM as, “securing the best 
mix of quality and effectiveness for the least outlay over the period 
of use of the goods or services bought. It is not about minimising 
upfront prices...”. The best mix can be interpreted as the best ratio 
between benefit (utility/return) and cost, or VfM = f (cost/benefit). 
HM Treasury (2008) adds that VfM is a relative concept and 
measured in comparison with other outcomes. Thus, Figure 1 
illustrates from an initial position (a particular mix or ratio of cost 
to benefit and which might be represented by a traditional 
government funded approach to procurement) any relative and 
alternative position associated with sectors/or positions A, B, C, D, 
E (for example, represented by Public-Private Partnerships bids) 
would constitute an improvement in VfM. 
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Figure 1: Value map and value improvement curve (Bridge, 
1999, p. 76) 
 
 
Figure 1 conveys the relative concept of VfM in simple terms, 
however, demonstrating VfM is a major challenge for all 
governments. More specifically,  this challenge is due to the scale, 
urgency and complexity of infrastructure but also more 
fundamentally due to the act of procuring infrastructure that is a 
unique event and which, therefore, escapes a categorical ex post 
(post contract/project completion) comparative analysis. In seeking 
to demonstrate VfM then, the emphasis is on the estimation of 
costs and benefits associated with alternative procurement modes. 
This paper proceeds to outline the challenge involved in estimating 
these costs and benefits and, in doing so, highlights weaknesses in 
current research and practice that may focus on a dominant 
performance outcome visible on the opening day of the asset when 
selecting the procurement mode. The paper then briefly describes a 
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schematic of a new-first-order procurement decision making model 
to address these weaknesses. 
 
 
2. THE VFM CHALLENGE 
 
Estimating costs and benefits of alternative modes of procurement 
is challenging for a number of reasons. For example, costs are 
whole life costs and require predictions of future repairs and 
maintenance. Furthermore, beyond near term capital costs and 
whole life costs (production costs) there are much less observable 
and more difficult to estimate transaction costs. These transaction 
costs occur in activities that are both internalised and externalised 
by government. Some of these transaction costs are shown in Table 
1.  
Market transaction costs generated in the engagement and 
administration of both internal resources and external private sector 
firms are rarely captured in full by government and elude accurate 
estimation. In terms of bureaucracy costs, recent benchmarking 
studies and notably the study by Raisbeck, Duffield and Xu (2010), 
are beginning to shed light on the relative performance of different 
procurement modes. In this study, the relative performance or 
certainty of outcomes from Public Private Partnerships (PPP) 
versus traditional procurement are measured in terms of percentage 
change in time and cost – in three time periods from formal 
approval to the point at which the asset is delivered and begins its 
operation. This kind of empirical work indicates the benefits of 
procurement modes that incorporate more single point 
responsibility (associated with less separability through less 
internalisation) across a greater service scope including design, 
construction and operations and maintenance. In turn, this creates 
greater incentive alignment that induces greater positive production 
investment in securing time and cost certainty and helps displace 
negative investment directed at meeting contractual obligations to 
the letter only (quality/performance shading).  
The phenomenon associated with the quasi-rents is commonly 
referred to as hold-up and is the threat of the contractor/consortium 
behaving in a negative opportunistic way upon the occurrence of a 
change or variation in the works. Variations can  occur during 
construction and/or during operations and maintenance and might 
see the contractor/consortium seeking to appropriate better terms 
(time and/or monies) from one or more of these variations. Hold-up 
can be prevented or reduced in its severity by the procurement 
approach. If the procurement mode successfully addresses hold-up, 
then no such post-contract transaction costs are observable and yet 
it is the mere threat or likelihood of hold-up that may inform the 
procurement approach. On top of the difficulties in estimating 
production costs and transaction costs, the estimation of benefit 
outcomes from alternative procurement modes and which may 
incorporate different design proposals, are subjective by definition 
in terms of aesthetics and difficult to evaluate objectively in terms 
of environmental impact. Moreover, other benefits or performance 
outcomes, for example concerning absolute/minimum time to 
deliver the infrastructure may again attract different utility values 
from various stakeholders. In summary, difficulties in estimating 
production costs and transaction costs seriously undermine 
attempts to objectively assess outcomes from alternative 
procurement modes. On the limitations of VfM tests and the Public 
Sector Comparator (PSC), the House of Lords Select Committee 
on Economic Affairs (2010) recommends that, “...its (PSC) value is 
limited by shortage of relevant data and by the selective inclusion 
of optimism bias. Even if these deficiencies were addressed as 
recommended above, public authorities should not rely solely on 
PSCs when choosing a procurement route”. 
 
 
3. WEAKNESSES IN CURRENT RESEARCH AND 
PRACTICE 
 
Chang and Ive (2002) note that since the 1970s there have been 
around 900 studies concerning procurement systems. Chang and 
Ive (2002) refer to Love, Skitmore and Earl (1998), and comment 
that amongst these studies the multi-attribute utility approach 
(MAUA) is regarded as the foremost technique appropriate for 
examining the criteria of clients and the preferences of expert 
weightings for each method in the most objective way. Rather than 
attempt to estimate actual production costs and transaction costs, 
MAUA starts with subjective weightings, mindful of the client’s 
requirements and the nature of the project, and which are applied to 
a range of attributes considered important - with a consensus 
emerging on eight attributes 1. Speed (early completion); 2. Price 
or time certainty; 3. Flexibility (to change design); 4. Quality 
standard (aesthetics; compliance with specification); 5. Complexity 
Table 1: Costs of internalisation and costs of externalisation (Source: Based on Bridge, Tiong and Wang, 2010, p.299) 
 Costs of internalised activity Costs of externalised activity 
Production 
costs 
• Direct costs of resources (salaries and on-costs; capital costs of 
equipment, buildings; operating costs) 
• Costs of mistakes caused by internalised activity/reworking by 
internal resources and reworking by external firms  
• Prices; service charges; patronage costs; 
contracts etc with external firms 
External 
transaction 
costs 
• Market transaction costs incurred in obtaining internal resources 
(staff; capital equipment; working space; consumables etc) 
• Market transaction costs involved in operating and managing 
internal resources e.g. cost of Human Resource Department in 
managing staff 
• Market transaction costs incurred in finding, 
bidding and negotiating prices with external 
firms; executing external contracts; contract 
management and administration 
• Costs associated with appropriation of better 
terms on the occurrence of a variation (hold-
up) at any stage of the project’s construction 
and/or operation  
Internal 
transaction 
costs 
• Bureaucracy costs associated with separability and lack of 
compliance (lack of certainty) with contracted cost, quality and 
time performance requirements 
• Bureaucracy costs associated with ownership/costs of low 
power incentives (incentive misalignment/lack of positive 
production investments and induced negative investment or 
quality/performance shading) 
• Loss of in-house knowledge, capability and 
competence 
 
 
 
  
(of building); 6. Risk allocation (transfer of risk); 7. Price 
competition; and 8. Responsibility (single point). The rationalised 
weightings are then multiplied by a utility factor representing the 
extent to which a procurement method satisfies each attribute and 
the most appropriate procurement method is taken to be the one 
with the highest score. A major problem that exists with MAUA is 
that the most appropriate procurement method is being defined as a 
subset, or effectively in the same terms as the desired outcomes of 
the procurement and is, therefore, tautological. A tautology is a 
statement of a relationship that is true by logic as in Popper’s 
(1959) p-q example. That is, if cause (read procurement mode) and 
effect (read outcomes from the asset/desired attributes) are defined 
in the same terms, or if cause or effect are defined as a subset of 
each other, then the relationship is circular and considered a truism 
that is not falsifiable. There is nothing inherently negative about 
tautologies and, in fact, the acceptance of a tautology can be useful. 
For example, consider an extreme case in which a government 
agency is faced with satisfying a dominant or key project 
performance outcome/attribute, say earliest completion. Here, the 
government agency may proceed from this outcome/effect 
upstream to the procurement mode/ cause that is selected on the 
basis that this procurement mode’s substantial strength (based on 
ex post empirical studies) equates to the desired key outcome, say 
Management Contracting (in terms of satisfying earliest 
completion). The selected procurement mode may then proceed to 
deliver the desired key outcome but at the same time may deliver 
lower performance outcomes/benefits than that achievable by other 
procurement modes - given the outcome/performance trade-off that 
exists amongst different procurement modes (Ive and Chang, 
2007). The selected procurement mode may well also represent an 
inferior approach to economising on the sum of production costs 
and transaction costs - given a lack of attention to production 
improvements resulting from incentive alignment and costs arising 
from incomplete contracting (Chang and Ive, 2002; Sweeney and 
Duffield, 2006). Despite this, as the procurement mode selected 
may succeed in terms of the key performance outcome, then this 
should render the selected procurement a success - as all other 
benefits beyond the key performance outcome should be set at 
zero. On the basis that the procurement mode selected is largely the 
only mode able to deliver the key outcome required, then all other 
procurement modes will result in value deterioration (value curve 
moving towards the right in Figure 1) relative to the cost/benefit 
position achieved by the selected procurement mode. Accepting a 
tautology is useful in this case, as the government agency 
responsible for delivery should be judged solely on whether or not 
the procurement mode’s was successful in delivering the key 
outcome. That is, VfM in nominal terms. Thus, this agency should 
then be relieved of having to demonstrate VfM in relative terms as 
defined previously. Much of the practiced-based research in the 
field of infrastructure procurement similarly focuses on project 
performance outcomes that are more readily observable at the 
opening day of an asset and concern time, cost and quality and in 
an ex post (post-contract) fashion. That is, the advantages and 
disadvantages or relative merits of different procurement 
approaches are recorded and established from ongoing and/or 
completed projects. In the same way as MAUA, the relative merits 
approach is restricted to indicating VfM in nominal terms. This 
paper assumes the case that government is seeking to deliver VfM 
in relative terms and can consider a range of performance 
outcomes/benefits attainable by a wide range of alternative 
procurement modes. Hence, the prevailing procurement mode is 
the mode that most closely corresponds with a priori theoretical 
predictions that includes production and transaction costs to 
indicate the best cost/benefit ratio. This assumption is realistic in 
terms of major infrastructure, on the basis that it is common 
practice in Australia to allow time to develop a PPP case whilst 
maintaining the option to revert to traditional procurement if 
necessary.  
In Australia, a recent benchmarking study into alliancing in 
the public sector, recommends that State Treasuries collaborate to 
develop a comprehensive procurement selection guide (Department 
of Treasury and Finance Victoria, Evans & Peck and The 
University of Melbourne 2009). In doing so, and in order to move 
past current weaknesses in research and practice, any such 
comprehensive guide needs to have as its focus the conditions 
surrounding the project as the starting point of analysis and not the 
project performance outcomes. That is, conditions concerning the 
technological and physical attributes of the project, as well as the 
capabilities and competencies of government versus the private 
sector relative to the project. The project conditions represent what 
is to be measured, whilst a priori theory guides how these 
conditions are measured and the manner by which resultant 
measurements informs procurement selection. The dominant 
microeconomic theory, Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
pertaining to governance and procurement and developed by Oliver 
Williamson (2009 Nobel Prize for Economics) has been 
substantially ignored in the field of infrastructure procurement. 
Also largely ignored, is the dominant strategic management theory 
concerning procurement, Resource–Based Theory (RBT). Much of 
RBT is attributable to Jay Barney and in certain applications, 
including the make-or-buy decision (internalisation or 
externalisation of activities) both Williamson and Barney point to 
the complementary strengths of TCE and RBT and their integration 
(Williamson, 1999; Barney 2002). Recent literature in the field of 
infrastructure procurement shows some signs of the application of 
TCE to procurement of major infrastructure procurement. For 
example, Duffield (2009) affirms the potential for TCE to 
contribute to the discussion of the most appropriate procurement 
strategy. Moreover, Bridge and Tisdell (2004) and Bridge (2008) 
have successfully developed and empirically tested an integration 
of TCE and RBT concerning the firm’s/government’s 
internalisation or externalisation decision. Bridge (2008) has also 
successfully developed and empirically tested TCE on the nature of 
the exchange decision.  
       The next section of this paper briefly sets-out a schematic of a 
new first-order procurement decision making model for public 
sector major infrastructure and which comprises five analytical and 
sequential tasks. This a priori model draws mainly from TCE; 
RBT and related theoretical and empirical work by Bridge and 
Tisdell (2004) and Bridge (2008). The model articulates the 
manner by which the determinants of transaction costs and 
production costs and/or benefits, as well as the conditions under 
which these different costs and benefits are likely to be dominant. 
This is then harnessed to inform a procurement approach and 
which can then carry a justifiable claim as delivering superior VfM 
in relative terms to competing procurement modes. 
 
 
4. SCHEMATIC OF NEW FIRST-ORDER 
PROCUREMENT DECISION MAKING MODEL 
 
4.1 Activity analysis 
 
The infrastructure project is broken down into activities using 
transaction costs and production cost/benefit logic. That is, a 
transaction cost occurs when a good or service is transferred across 
a technologically separable interface (Williamson 1981) and which 
helps create a natural division of labour. The extent to which 
division of labour will occur is explained by classical theory of 
production as turning on the extent of the market demand that 
  
generates scale economies, including the accumulation of 
knowledge or learning curve economies. In turn, this justifies 
investments made in special purpose technology. Deploying this 
logic, infrastructure can be broken down into activities that 
correspond with the highest level of market specialisation. Such 
that, if there exists market firms specialising in an activity that lies 
within the boundaries of the project, then an activity has been 
identified. For example, a road project may comprise a number of 
technologically separable major work packages or supply chains, 
including major and minor civil engineering works; building 
works; mechanical and electrical works; and a tolling system. 
Alternatively a project may comprise only one work 
package/supply chain. Within each work package or supply chain, 
there may be market firms that specialise in some part or all of the 
management and/or design and/or construction and/or operations 
and maintenance associated with the work package. The extent to 
which the project is decomposed into activities depends in the first 
instance on the local market and requires some iterative analysis 
between project and market.  
 
 
4.2 Internalisation versus externalisation analysis 
 
The decision whether to locate an activity within or outside the 
firm is known as the make-or-buy decision and it is this decision 
that determines the extent to which the firm is vertically integrated. 
In the context of this paper, the firm equates to the government 
and, therefore, this decision determines the vertical boundaries 
between the public sector and private sector in infrastructure 
projects. More specifically, the make decision, or internalisation, is 
a mode of operation in which government is able to exert direct 
control over resources and is wholly responsible for an activity. As 
such, this definition would include a contract of employment and a 
government agency. Whereas, the buy decision, or externalisation, 
comprises all other modes of operation. From an economic 
viewpoint, the make-or-buy decision turns on a comparison of 
value created through internationalisation versus externalisation 
(again, depicted by Figure 1). It is unlikely that government will 
either wholly internalise the delivery of a piece of infrastructure or 
entirely externalise the delivery of an infrastructure project. Each 
of the non-core production activities comprising management; 
design; construction and operations and maintenance involves 
different technology bases and requires different bundles of 
resources with different capabilities and competencies. 
Fundamentally, naturally occurring opportunities to develop 
learning curve economies and economies of scale across and 
within each key activity will favour either government or the 
private sector. This creates differences between government and 
private sector in terms of capabilities and competencies with 
respect to each of these key activities and their sub-activities and 
differences between government and the private sector in terms of 
the ability to manage risks associated with each key activity/sub-
activity. In turn, this explains different value positions achievable 
by the private sector relative to that achievable by government with 
regard to each activity/sub-activity. In pursuance of achieving a 
final value position closest to the vertical axis, the better overall 
alternative for the project becomes some combination of 
government and private provision and this explains why VFM is 
best achieved through government making and buying activities 
within a piece of infrastructure.  
Bridge and Tisdell (2004) have developed an integration of 
TCE and RBT based on the concept of a capability and competence 
spectrum between the firm/government and market. At the 
extremes, the firm/government and market have capabilities 
beyond each other in terms of certain activities. Such that, a 
capability/competence (RBT) logic dominates and which reflects 
minimising production costs and maximising production benefits. 
On the other hand, the firm/government and market may display 
similar levels of capability and competence relative to an activity 
and this time a transaction cost (TCE) logic (including bureaucracy 
costs and hold-up) is dominant in terms of assigning the activity to 
either government or private sector to minimise transaction costs. 
Bridge (2008) has successfully tested this integration and 
developed patterns of the RBT and TCE measurements 
summarised in Table 2. 
Table 2: Externalisation or Internalisation of Activities (Based 
on Bridge and Tisdell 2004) 
Pattern of RBT and 
TCE  
Measurements (six 
key measurements) 
Theory  Logic  Make-
or-Buy  
Pattern 1  RBT  Product/ 
Production 
Capability  
Internal  
Pattern 2  RBT  Production 
competence  
Internal  
Pattern 3  RBT/  
Transaction 
costs  
Organisation 
Competence  
Internal  
Pattern 4a  TCE  Hold-up / 
Transactional 
Competence  
Internal  
Pattern 4b  TCE  Hold-up / 
Transactional 
Competence  
External 
Pattern 5  RBT/  
Transaction 
costs  
Organisation 
Competence  
External 
Pattern 6  RBT  Production 
Competence  
External 
Pattern 7  RBT  Product/ 
Production 
Capability  
External 
 
RBT measurements concern the relative capability and 
competence of government versus the private sector relative to the 
activity and TCE measurements concern physical and 
technological attributes of the project. By applying these 
measurements to each activity in the project an actual pattern for 
each activity is generated that is matched with the closest predicted 
pattern in Table 2. In doing so, this indicates whether the activity 
should be internalised or externalised to achieve greatest 
effectiveness and efficiency, including the most efficient allocation 
of risks. This approach to identifying the party best able to manage 
risks associated with an activity is a significant departure from 
current practice. That is, instead of seeking to identify and estimate 
risks at an early developmental stage of the project, the focus is on 
resources held by government versus private sector and relative to 
each project activity as a means to more fundamentally and more 
reliably anticipate which party is best placed to manage risks 
associated with each activity. Jin and Doloi (2008) have identified 
the application of RBT and TCE in risk allocation but have done so 
from a risk management process perceptive. In contrast, 
application of Bridge and Tisdell’s (2004) integration framework is 
at the level of the activity and, therefore, can contribute toward 
identifying the procurement mode that is likely to deliver superior 
VfM. 
 
  
4.3 Market analysis 
 
A structure-conduct-performance analysis is undertaken to identify 
the market structure surrounding each activity assigned to one of 
the four predictive patterns concerning externalization (4b; 5; 6; 
and 7). Bridge and Tisdell (2004) explain that these patterns have 
been developed to correspond with particular market structures, 
from perfect competition (Pattern 5) with a high level of price 
competition to market structures with much less price competition, 
such as oligopoly/duopoly/monopoly (Pattern 7). 
Hence, this task provides a check against the actual patterns 
developed using the RBT and TCE measurements and which are 
matched to the closest predicted pattern. That is, the actual market 
structure surrounding the activity should also correspond with the 
predicted market structure associated with the predicted pattern. 
This task also helps eliminate the bundling together of design, 
construction, operations and maintenance activity where this would 
create insufficient competition. That is, any design, construction, 
operation and maintenance activities within the same work 
package/supply chain identified as a Pattern 7 activity would not be 
bundled if this would further reduce competition – given Pattern 7 
activities already represent limited price competition associated 
with Pattern 7 oligopoly market structure. 
 
 
4.4 Bundling analysis 
 
To be clear about what this task does not seek to achieve. The 
purpose of contemplating whether or not to bundle Design and 
Construction (DC) or Design and Construction and Operations and 
Maintenance (DCOM) in this task is not directly in pursuance of 
project outcomes such as minimum time to complete project; or 
minimum life cycle/capital cost; or maximum control over the 
quality/aesthetic attributes of the project. Whilst bundling does 
affect these project outcomes, the model assumes that government 
is able to accept the particular profile of time, cost and quality 
outcome that is represented by the procurement approach derived 
from the application of transaction cost and production cost theory 
in pursuance of the superior VfM (defined as a relative concept). 
Therefore, the purpose of this current task is to determine the level 
of bundling of activities within a project in pursuance of 
minimising bureaucracy costs (and thereby maximising certainty or 
compliance with contracted time, cost and specification) and 
minimising the potential for hold-up (and therefore also improving 
certainty in terms of cost). The problem of bundling in this case, is 
that minimising bureaucracy costs involves greater use of single-
point contact with a private sector firm across a wide range of 
activities (transfer of control to private sector firm), whilst 
minimising hold-up involves the greater use of internalised 
management (or use of agents) and control over private sector 
firms. Thus, there is tension or a trade-off in the extent to which 
both types of transaction costs can be minimised.  
To address this, all activities assigned as a Pattern 4b activity 
with a very high potential for hold-up (that have a very high level 
of asset specificity and very high level of uncertainty) can be 
excluded from bundling with other activities on the basis that 
government is better placed to manage potential hold-up in these 
activities if it directly engages and/or collaborates with the private 
sector firms supplying these activities. Additionally, some or all of 
the Pattern 7 activities might have already been excluded from 
bundling - as explained in the previous section. The remaining 
pattern 5 and 6 activities (and perhaps some or all of the Pattern 7 
activities where their involvement in bundling is not considered to 
further reduce already minimal levels of competition) can then be 
bundled within their respective work package/supply chain to 
minimise bureaucracy costs and maximum certainty or compliance 
with contracted time, cost and specification. This approach is 
consistent with Hart’s (2003) much cited development of 
incomplete contracting theory concerning PPPs and 
recommendations from the House of Lords Select Committee on 
Economics Affairs (2010) again concerning PPPs. Hart (2003: 300) 
concludes that, “PPP is good if the quality of the service can be 
well specified in the initial contract (or, more generally, there are 
good performance measures which can be used to penalize the 
service provider), whereas the quality of the building cannot be”. 
Moreover, the House of Lords (2010; 31) recommend that, “the 
projects most suitable for private finance are those where the 
requirements can be clearly specified at the outset and which are of 
size that consortia or private sector companies can take on their 
balance sheets”. Thus, projects incorporating a significant level of 
activity at Pattern 4b that correspond with lack of ability to specify 
and possibility some projects that are dominated by Pattern 7 
activities and which correspond with a lack of ability to specify 
and/or high degree of complexity/size are excluded from PPP 
analysis. The prospect of a PPP can then usefully be considered in 
relation to any DCOM bundle indentified within the project/as 
representing the project (comprising Pattern 5 and/or 6 activities, 
and/or possibly Pattern 7 activities – where including Pattern 7 
activities in bundling is not considered to further reduce 
competition). 
 
 
4.5 Exchange relationship analysis 
 
Each private sector contract engaged by government to supply a 
single activity/service or bundled service will require government 
to determine the most efficient exchange relationship with the 
private sector firm at the head of the supply chain/bundle. The 
exchange relationship can be considered to be a continuum from a 
more traditional arms-length or discrete (classical/neo-classical 
contract) exchange to a relational exchange. A discrete relationship 
is inefficient when it includes costly to write credible threats 
concerning performance but which may be necessary to pre-empt 
hold-up by the contractor/consortium post contract. Bridge (2008) 
has successfully developed TCE on the issue of the external 
exchange relationship and the key outcome of this work is shown 
in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Exchange relationship analysis (Bridge 2008) 
 
 
Contracts that are dominated by Pattern 4b activities (Box 1) 
have a very high potential for hold-up and government can more 
efficiently seek to control these contracts using more collaborative 
approaches or seek to share risk in an alliance fashion. Contracts 
dominated by Pattern 5 and 6 activities (Box 2) reflect the efficient 
transfer of risk and control to the contractor/consortium concerned. 
Standard neo-classical contracts can be deployed to obtain a fixed 
priced for construction only and/or DC and/or DCOM services. If a 
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DCOM contract with private finance is being used in the case of 
Pattern 5 and 6 activities, then a conventional PPP arrangement is 
appropriate. Contracts that are dominated by Pattern 7 activities 
(Box 3) again have a very high potential for hold-up. This time, 
however, government lacks in-house capability and lacks access to 
agents to effectively collaborate with the contractor/consortium in 
terms of design, construction or operations and maintenance. In 
transferring control to the contractor/consortium, government can 
seek assurances through writing contracts with credible threats 
concerning compliance with contracted performance. At the same 
time and given the very high scale/complexity of these projects, 
government may relax the desire for a fixed price – particularly if 
the contract involves DCOM services and private finance. Here, a 
non-conventional PPP may be appropriate, perhaps including some 
sharing of risks along with performance incentives.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper proposes a mind-set change in the practice of selecting 
the procurement mode. That is, from an approach which begins 
with a dominant performance outcome visible at the opening day 
of an asset to an approach in which the analysis commences with 
the conditions pertaining to the project. The model outlined in this 
paper reflects this change and differs significantly from 
Infrastructure Australia’s (2009) five step process for selecting a 
delivery model and Grimsey and Lewis' (2009) procurement 
framework. More specifically, the model in this paper goes beyond 
the project’s scale/complexity and includes as part of its starting 
conditions the capability and competence of government versus 
private sector relative to the project. Also, the model in this paper 
explicitly involves the integrative application of Nobel Prize 
winning and empirically tested transaction costs and production 
theory to measure the project conditions and then indicates a 
procurement approach. In terms of VfM, the practice of  focusing 
on a dominant project performance outcome as a means to 
selecting the procurement mode is restricted to delivering VfM in 
nominal terms.  That is, the procurement mode either delivers or 
does not deliver on the performance outcome. If it does deliver on 
this outcome, then the procurement has been successful, even 
though it may under-deliver on other performance outcomes – 
potentially achievable by other procurement modes. It may also fail 
to minimise transaction costs, as no planned attempt is being made 
to address these transaction costs in the procurement selection. In 
contrast, the approach to procurement selection in this paper’s 
model and which commences with conditions, can carry a 
justifiable claim that it delivers superior VfM in relative terms.  
The first-order procurement decision making model in this 
paper could be complementary to the PSC, in so far as, the model 
may cross validate the PSC. Moreover, given that the transaction 
costs and production theory measurements are all indirect and do 
not require estimates in monetary terms, the first-order 
procurement decision making model then lends itself to public 
dissemination. As alternative to the PSC, however, the first order 
procurement decision making model would save time and cost in 
not going to the full extent of detail as required in the reference 
project associated with the PSC. Also, if a PPP is selected by 
following the first order procurement decision making model and 
in the absence of a reference project, then this may send a stronger 
signal to the private sector and which in turn may encourage more 
innovation and competition. 
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